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Situation in the Far East
There is nothing more transient than the authority of a traveler in the Far East as a reporter
of recent events. So much has happened since
early December when I left Manchuria at the
Siberian border after a sojourn of a little less than
three months in China and Japan that a considerable part of the information upon which I should
have to rely in giving a picture of the situation as
I see it today is information already at your disposal. It will therefore be more profitable if I
devote the greater part of what I have to say to a
description and analysis of the background of the
drama which is now being enacted. Moreover,
observation of different phases of public opinion
here since my return has led me to believe that a
knowledge of the background is no less important
than accurate knowledge of current happenings,
if the significance of the latter is to be understood.
I shall therefore try to sketch first some important features of the background, proceeding from
that to a recapitulation of what has happened in
Manchuria and the vicinity of Shanghai, and finally to a consideration of American policy as regards the existing situation.
The Question of Sovereignty.

Let us first consider the question of sovereignty
in China and also in Japan, with special refer1

ence to its exercise in intercourse with other nations and with each other. For it so happens that
this very question of the exercise and expression
of sovereignty, while raised in different ways in
the two countries, is very near to being, if it is not
actually, the most vital factor in the whole situation, with respect to each.
It would be beyond my competence to discuss
the subject of sovereignty as a technical legal
question. But the phases of that subject to which
I shall refer appear susceptible of statement in
simple terms which I trust will not be open to
technical objection.
China's lack of complete sovereignty in the
sense that its nominal Government, whether theoretically acknowledged by all the people or not, is
not actually effective within its borders, and in the
sense that includes the capacity to maintain a reasonable degree of order and to observe international obligations, is not only the cause of the
grievances alleged to have been suffered by the
Japanese, but is also the ground on which rests
the Japanese claim that direct action to enforce
their rights on Chinese soil is a matter of necessary self-defense and not a violation of sovereignty. You cannot, they say, violate something
which has only a :fictitious existence. How far can
these claims be justified 1
The Concept of Nationality.
First of all it must be admitted that China has
never had the concept of nationality in the sense
that these words convey to us. This is not to be
taken as a disparagement of Chinese political traditions. The concept of nationality as we understand it has to a large extent been created by the
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exigencies of intercourse between nations. Ancient China got along quite happily, from her point
of view, without such intercourse, although of
course the country was far from impervious to
infiltrations of foreign cultures, notably that of
India. An important element in our concept of
nationality is a well-organized government,
whether autocr~tic or democratic, which exercises
authority over a whole people, with codes or other
systems of law prescribing the rights and duties
of subjects or citizens. Ancient China was not
wholly without government, but the authority descending from the Throne, through ministers,
viceroys, governors, and district magistrates, existed chiefly for purposes of tribute and taxation,
and was not relied upon as the means of regulating
the conduct of individuals. This does not mean
that their conduct was not regulated; with due allowance for differences in the conception of in. dividual and social interest, it was very admirably
regulated by precept and tradition enforced by
patriarchal and other social control, notably that
of the trade guilds. It is contact with the outer
world, with her neighbors and with other countries
with whom modern China has been more or less
forced into commercial relations, that has exposed
the inadequacy of Chinese political concepts and
traditions to cope satisfactoriJy with the obligations resting upon members of the family of ·nations.
It js this aspect of what I have roughly called
Chinese sovereignty which is chiefly accountable
for the whole tragic history of China's relations
with other countries during the last hundred
years, and this to her disadvantage rather than to
her discredit; and it is the largest causative factor
3

in her recent troubles with Japan, whether these
be regarded as a pretext for Japanese aggression,
or as a complete justification for Japanese measures of self-defense.
Chinese Sovereignty in Manchuria.
To apply what I have said a little more concretely to Manchuria, it should be added that, although Manchuria has been admittedly a part of
China and has been repeatedly acknowledged to
be such by Japan, as well as by other countries,
no government existing in China since the fall of
the Manchu Dynasty has functioned as the government of Manchuria or of any of its provinces.
When the Young Marshal, Chang Hsiao Liang,
hoisted the Nationalist flag in Mukden in 1928,
that was regarded as a significant gesture of adherence to the Central Government; but neither
before nor after that event did the writ of Nanking run in the Three Eastern Provinces, nor was
the behavior of their inhabitants under the slightest control from the Central Government. If
troubles arose, as they frequently did, between the
Japanese and the Chinese in Manchuria, pro forma
representations and protests might be addressed
through orthodox channels by Tokyo to Nanking;
and nominal assurances of attention might be
given-or not, as the case might be; but if anything required to be done on the Chinese side to
protect Japanese rights or to remedy abuses, it
had to be done by the local authority. The scene
was admirably set for evasion and procrastination, if these were desired, as of course they were ;
for Nanking disputed the very validity of the
treaties and agre.e ments under which Japan was
carrying on her railroads and her commercial and
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industrial operations in Manchuria. Nanking
"passed the buck" to Mukden, and Mukden passed
it back to Nanking. Meanwhile a multitude of
grievances accumulated, any of which, with a reasonably accommodating spirit on both sides, could
have been settled in favor of one side or the other.
An explosion of some kind was inevitable.
Lack of Competent Authority Thwarts
Amicable Adjustments.
As we review the whole story of events beginning with the outbreak on September 18, 1931,
we see how constantly the lack of competent
Chinese authority rises to thwart all efforts toward peaceable adjustment. The situation has
been aggravated ever since then at periods in
which even the shadow of authority observable at
Nanking has at times disappeared, and those most
anxious to press measures of conciliation have
been unable to locate the responsible authority.
The nearest approach to such authority might be
found at one moment in the Mayor of Greater
Shanghai, at another in the general commanding
the 19th Route Army, at another in the titular
Minister of Foreign Affairs at Nanking, and at
another in the person of General Chiang Kai-shek
at Loyang or Nanking. Woe to the unlucky official or general who in the exercise of his apparent
authority might sign a truce or other agreement
involving concessions hurtful to Chinese pride,
for he would be a marked man thereafter. This
lack of authority or timidity in exercising it has
had much to do with the recent delays in bringing
about a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai.
Who can blame the eloquent, persuasivG, and
doubtless sincere Chinese spokesmen in Geneva
5

and in the principal foreign capitals who have protested on behalf of their country against undi::;puted invasions of her territory in terms expressing readiness on China's part to take every measure and fulfil every obligation which a responsible
Government could agree to-undertakings in Manchuria to maintain order and enter into direct
negotiations, if only the Japanese would withdraw; undertakings at Shanghai to withdraw her
own soldiers from the surrounding territory, if
the Japanese would :first completely evacuate? And
yet, neither in Manchuria nor in Shanghai were
there any indications that the performance could
match the promise. The obvious fact was that
performance was impossible to guarantee, even
with the utmost sincerity and goodwill at Nanking.
The process by which serious friction or war
between responsible and well ordered governments is avoided does not depend upon the absence
of irritations and grievances. It is made possible
partly by a conciliatory disposition on both sides,
but chiefly by the fact that rational discussion and
negotiation are possible at the initial stages of
friction, with confidence on both sides that, if
honest and apparently irreconcilable differences
persist, resort to impartial methods of settlement
will be possible and its terms accepted. It is easy
to see, however, that the possibility of establishing contact between the parties at the initial stages
of trouble is of vital importance if peaceful relations are to be maintained. Without such contact
small grievances grow into large ones and accumulate to a formidable bulk with the passage of
time. Every encouragement is thus given to irresponsible parties to retaliate aga~nst intolerable
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abuses. This has been J apan's experience with
China for many years and especially during the
past two years. To say this is not to imply that
the grievances are all on one side. As breeders of
international strife unsatisfied complaints are mischievous, not because either side is all right or all
wrong, but because there is no means of handling
and disposing of them.
Expression of Sovereign Power in Japan.

The definition and the location of the sovereign
power in Japan has been a hardly less disturbing
factor in the situation, although it has come into
prominence rather in the precipitation of the conflict last September and in the subsequent handling
of it by Japan up to the present time than in connection with the fundamental merits of Japan's
case. This factor may be described as a division
or ambiguity of responsibility as between the parliamentary Government represented by the Cabinet, and the military and naval authority who
regard their responsibility as being directly to the
Throne, though dependent upon parliamentary
grants of money. Apart, however, from the real
if not nominal independence of the army and navy
and their consequent ability to commit the Government through a fait accompli, there is also the
factor of discretionary power vested in a military
commander in the field to act in an emergency to
protect his forces and the nationals for whose
safety he is responsible from an immediate attack,
or danger of attack, from opposing forces. It is
my opinion that the military action taken by the
Japanese on September 18 was actually the use,
or abuse, of the discretionary power to which I
have just referred. The action once taken, how7

ever, was backed up by the highest military authorities, while the civil authorities, taken unawares by the whole proceeding, were forced to
make the best of it. They did so by minimizing
the scope and importance of the outbreak and by
giving to the other Powers assurances of Japanese
self-restraint which they were subsequently unable to make good, owing to the emergence of the
military part of the Government as sole masters
of the situation. There is no reason to doubt the
good faith in which these assurances were given
by the civil government; and it is easy to imagine
the embarrassment and chagrin which it suffered
when they were belied by events. Inasmuch, however, as the Foreign Office remained as the channel of communication with the outside world, an
attempt had to be made to rationalize the whole
procedure after the event-a process which was
facilitated by the normal growth of the war spirit
to the point where national unanimity was virtually attained, at least so far as the feeling of the
people was articulate. We are all too familiar
with the development of nationalistic spirit and
war fever in the Great War to require any explanation of the steps by which the Japanese people have come to the point of presenting a practically united front not only against China but
also against criticism from abroad. The conflict
or ambiguity of authority in Japan has also been
masked to some extent by the retirement of the
Minseito party in December, its replacement by
the Seiyukai party, and the Cabinet changes which
have taken place recently, all of which reflect a
greater harmony, if not a real unity, of authority;
but the latent disunity remains as a grave constitutional defect which I believe the Japanese peo8

ple would like to see changed by the same process
as that which established the Constitution,
namely, by the free and complete delegation by
the Throne of the responsibilities of national de:
fence to a government wholly and unequivocally
responsible to Parliament, even if this change
should reflect for the time being a less liberal and
a more aggressive policy.
Incomplete Sovereignty in China-Equivocal
Authority in Japan.
It is evident, however, that the foregoing observations affecting the definition of Japanese sovereignty refer to something quite different from
those referring to a lack of complete sovereignty
in China. The equivocal location of authority in
Japan does not imply the lack of real authority;
it merely explains in large measure certain inconsistencies between official pronouncements and
events that have transpired, especially during the
earlier part of the past six months, If there have
at times been similar inconsistencies in connection with the development of the fighting at
Shanghai from a small scale to a large one, it is to
be accounted for rather by the local military control, and the exigencies of the situation in the field
than by a conflict of authority in Tokyo.

Japan's Vital Interests.
The next feature of the background to which I
should like to call your attention is that of Japan's
so-called vital interests in Manchuria. By these
I refer not so much to the specific provisions of
treaties and agreements on which Japan's rights
in Manchuria are based; I refer rather to the un9

derlying interests of food, trade and industrial
development which from the Japanese point of
view are vital to the welfare, if not to the very existence, of Japan as an independent nation. These
underlying interests explain why it is that Japan
insists on the validity of her treaties and agreements with China. Japan's population has been
increasing at the rate of nearly a million a year,
and unless something happens to retard this rate
of growth, relief must come either by emigration
or by much more extensive industrial development
as the basis of a foreign trade enabling her to import the necessities of life. Both Japanese and
foreign economists agree that even if unrestricted
opportunities for emigration were open, they
would hardly take care of more than ten per cent
of the annual increment of population. This percentage would undoubtedly be much larger if
Korea and Manchuria were available as fields of
extensive colonization; but as a matter of fact, the
Japanese will not go in significant numbers to the
mainland, partly because of the rigor of the climate, and partly because the much lower standard
of living of the Koreans and Chinese makes it
practically impossible for Japanese farmers and
petty tradesmen to compete with the native population. A dependable source of agricultural and
mineral products and expanding trade therefore
offer the only way of providing a living for a rapidly growing population. It is possible, indeed
not unlikely, that owing to the rise in the standard
of living Japan will before long experience a tendency toward a greatly reduced rate of increase in
population, if not indeed a stationary position in
this regard. But this is more a matter of prophecy
than of reality, and it does not modify the univer-
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sal belief of the J apanese people that Manchuria
as a source of food and raw materials and as a field
for industrial and commercial development is an
absolute necessity to the country. They urge this,
however, not as an excuse for conquest, which they
consistently disavow as a motive, but as a reasonable ground for demanding from those who actually govern Manchuria cooperation in these reasonable objectives of national policy, rather than
constant obstruction and frustration of that
policy.
The Strategic Factor.
Closely identified with Japan's economic interest in Manchuria is her strategic interest in that
area as a possible base of military operations hostile to the independence and survival of Japan.
The Japanese people will never forget what it cost
them in blood and treasure to resist the Russian
menace of 1904-05. To them that menace is not
an academic theory such as General Staffs and
War Colleges like to play with as an intellectual
discipline for military experts. It is a living terror made only more real after the Russo-Japanese
War by the discovery that their country was then
so nearly at the end of its resources. Manchuria
cannot be allowed either to harbor a hostile Power
or to be in a state of anarchy such as to invite infringement of its territory by such a Power. This
is perhaps the most striking example in the world
today of a realistic factor which the formal mechanisms for the preservation of peace have got to
take into account. The subordination of law to
public opinion and feeling, of which examples are
not wanting in other fields of legislation, is never
more clear or imperative than where the literal
11

application of international law and treaties is
thought, whether rightly or wrongly, to be incompatible with the natural law of self-preservation.
Whether this is a justifiable attitude or not, it is a
real one and has to be taken into account as part
of the objective background of Sino-Japanese relations.
Manchuria in September, 1931.
With these facts and considerations before us,
let us turn to the situation in Manchuria in September, 1931. Jap_a n was in possession of the
leased territory of K wantung at the lower end of
the Liaotung Peninsula, where the South Manchurian Railway had its terminus at the Port of
Dairen. It was also in possession of the railway
zone comprising a narrow strip of land on either
side of the roadbed extending north through Mukden to Changchung and southeast from Mukden to
Antung at the Korean border. At the main railway centers the zone was expanded to include a
larger area to accommodate terminals, warehouses
and various facilities incidental to the operation
of the railway. Within the leased territory and
the zone Japan exercised complete jurisdiction except in regard to maritime customs and the salt
revenue which remained within Chinese control;
outside the zone Japanese and other foreigners
enjoyed the rights of extraterritoriality as in other
parts of China. In all other respects the vast territory of Manchuria was under Chinese control
with a provincial governor in each of the Three
Eastern Provinces, but with Chang Hsiao Liang,
the Young Marshal, as acknowledged overlord of
the whole territory. His title of Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the National Army was the sym-
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bol of his allegiance to the Government in Nanking. While Manchuria had enjoyed under the
Young Marshal and his father, Chang Tso Lin, a
greater degree of security and order than any
other part of China, banditry was rife, and what
was perhaps even worse, an army of 300,000
soldiers constituted a heavy and needless burden
on the resources of the country-a force probably
twenty times as large as a well disciplined constabulary competent to preserve order would have
to be. The exactions from the people to maintain
an army of 300,000 men and the expenses of the
Young Marshal's court constituted an intolerable
burden on the people. These exactions took the
forms not only of oppressive taxation, but also of
successive debasements of the currency, a method
of confiscation as cruel as it was effective.
Japan's Failure to Consult Other Powers.
This state of affairs was of concern to Japan,
as it would be to any foreign Power, only to the
extent that it infringed or endangered its rights
and interests. That it did so, and that every possibility of relief through direct negotiation or by
an amelioration of conditions had been exhausted,
is the basis for Japan's claim that her actions
throughout the campaign have been purely defensive. Particular incidents precipitating the conflict are of little importance as compared with the
fundamental conditions I have described. From
the point of view of the rest of the world, however,
and especially from that of Japan's friends, it was
unfortunate that defensive measures so clearly
taking the form of an aggressive infringement of
Chinese territory should not have been preceded
by consultation with the League of Nations and
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with the leading Powers parties to the Pact of
Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty, so that Japan
would not have acted as the sole judge of a procedure which, at least prima facie, was incompatible with treaties the sanctity of which was a common interest of all the Powers. There is not a
particle of doubt in my opinion that such consultation would have preceded military measures, had
the action of the Government not been forestalled
by the steps taken by the army in Manchuriasteps rather unconvincingly justified by the plea
of emergency.
Annexation Not Desired by Japan.
There is no reason, in my opinion, for refusing
to accept at its face value the repeated declaration of the Japanese that they never have aimed
and do not now aim at the political annexation of
Manchuria. Japan has no desire to assume the
responsibilities involved in the government of a
country consisting of nearly 30,000,000 Chinese.
What she wants is a government of and by Chinese
with whom she can cooperate on the basis of the
treaties in the future economic development of the
country. The :first step in this direction was the
improvization of local governing committees of
Chinese, employing police of their own nationality; the second step was the organization of a central government of the territory under a Manchurian chief. There is no denying that both local
and territorial governments were set up by Japanese and are still largely under Japanese control.
In this sense they are puppet governments. But
if Japanese hopes are realized of their actually
developing peace and security to a degree not
hitherto experienced, and if this position can be
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safeguarded by an eventual relationship not unlike
that between the United States and Cuba, the puppet government may be expected to become a real
one under which the interests of both Japanese
and Chinese will be secure.

I

'

l
J

The Boycott in China.
Something approaching an acquiescence on the
part of foreign opinion in such a process was becoming more and more evident when the crisis in
Shanghai was created by the Japanese naval demonstration backing a demand upon the local
Chinese authorities that the organization responsible for the anti-Japanese agitation and boycott
should be dissolved. A good deal of humor has
been displayed over the alleged naivete of the
Japanese in supposing that they could win Chinese customers at the point of a bayonet. But this
is not quite an adequate description of what they
were trying to do. The anti-Japanese boycott had
been going on a long time when the Japanese occupation of Manchuria brought it to a pitch of intensity and severity never before witnessed in
that land of boycotts. It went much further than
mere abstention from buying Japanese goods. All
intercourse with Japanese was forbidden by the
so-called National Salvation and Anti-Japanese
Association. Chinese employees were withdrawn
from Japanese banks, :firms and individuals. Chinese merchants in possession of Japanese goods
were intimidated, squeezed, and imprisoned, and
goods were confiscated, all by utterly lawless organizations. A "racket" of no small proportions
developed through the sale of confiscated goods.
It is true that the Chinese people were swept by a
wave of anti-Japanese feeling that made the boy15

cott at first almost wholly spontaneous; but its
effectiveness and duration were largely due to the
lawless activities of the organization. Foreign
merchants in Shanghai last October stated that
nothing approaching the intensity or effectiveness
of this boycott had ever been seen before; and the
Japanese merchants of Shanghai, usually to be
found in opposition to any avoidable disturbance
of international relations likely to hamper trade,
asserted that so far as their business was concerned, war could be no worse and they were therefore for the first time in favor of the most drastic
action necessary to bring China to terms.

What Happened in Shanghai.
When the first demonstration of force was made
at Shanghai, but before the fighting began, it was
undoubtedly the belief of the Japanese that a show
of force would be sufficient to bring compliance
with their demands for the suppression of the disorder and violence to . which many of the 26,000
Japanese residents were exposed, and for the dissolution of the boycott organization. These were
reasonable demands if one could dissociate the
situation in Shanghai from the continued violation of Chinese territory in Manchuria, but it was
too much to expect that dissociation in the minds
of the Chinese. When the Chinese mayor made a
verbal compliance with the Japanese demands, he
doubtless thought it wise to do so and meant what
he said. He reckoned, however, without his inflamed fellow-citizens and the large number of
Chinese troops in and about the city. The evidence
that trouble was brewing was so plain that the
Municipal Council of the International Settlement
declared a state of emergency to exist, and that
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declaration automatically placed the defensive
forces of the Settlement-British soldiers, .American and Japanese marines, and the Volunteer
Corps-at their stations along the borders of the
Settlement. It is important to note that whatever
may have been the blame attaching to the Japanese by reason of their :first demonstration of force,
their marines up to this point acted not as members of an invading force, but in cooperation with
the other defenders of the Settlement. The J apanese sector ·was on the borders of Chapei, where
6,000 Japanese men, women, and children were living outside the Settlement. What happened next
is not quite clear, but apparently the appearance
of the Japanese marines was the signal for a fusillade from Chinese soldiers and snipers, later reinforced by artillery :fire from armored trains in the
North Station. Whether the Japanese marines
were :fired upon before or after they crossed the
boundary line, it would be ridiculous to suppose
that their action was anything but defensive. They
had their own 6,000 civilians to protect and their
action, whether wise or not, requires no other explanation; for the force of bluejackets was far too
small to have attempted a seizure of the city. As
subsequent events proved, a force ten times as
large would hardly have sufficed for such a purpose.
Before condemning the Japanese for the ruthlessness of their action in Shanghai, it is well to
understand what happened at the outset. What
happened subsequently was that the small defensive force and the civilians under their protection
were in imminent danger of massacre by overwhelming numbers. This explains the initial
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bombing by airplanes in the vicinity of the North
Station, a terrible procedure which however did
not exceed in terror the situation it was intended
to relieve. From that time on, nothing that happened can be ascribed to any prearranged plan.
Hell had broken loose with both sides fighting desperately to hold their ground, and the tinder which
had been lit by a few rifle shots grew into a conflagration which, through the weeks that ensued,
became a major military operation demanding
constant reinforcements on both sides, until :finally a force of nearly 50,000 Japanese succeeded
in driving the larger Chinese army back a dozen
miles away from the city.

A Tragic Blunder.
The Japanese failure to anticipate the consequences of their first demonstration of force was
of course from every point of view a tragic blunder causing the loss of thousands of Japanese and
Chinese lives, the dispossession of hundreds of
thousands of civilians, and the destruction of their
ho;mes and places of business. The safety of the
International Settlement was also gravely compromised. The Chinese were certainly no more
disposed toward friendship with the Japanese,
and the expenses involved on the Japanese side
were a terrible burden on an already crippled budget. All this was surely a ghastly demonstration
of the futility of war. Yet when one considers the
steps leading insidiously to the ultimate result,
one sees that the fault lay in the rash appeal to
force, rather than in any design on the part of the
Japanese to bring about what actually occurred.
But that again is the normal outcome of war.
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The International Settlement.
The whole episode at Shanghai has greatly increased the difficulties growing out of the abnormal status of the I nternational Settlement which
is actually something very much like a little international republic on Chinese soil with a constitution consisting of treaties and Land Regulations
going back beyond the middle of the last century.
It has a Municipal Assembly elected by foreign
and Chinese ratepayers in which the British and
the Chinese each have five representatives, the
Americans two, and the Japanese two. It performs all the functions of a municipal government,
performs them well, and provides in the Settlement an island of comparative security for about
65,000 foreigners and 900,000 Chinese. The relative stability of this island of security has made
it possible for Shanghai to become one of the
greatest ports and markets in the world and an
entrepot for all the trade of the Y angtse valley.
While the armed defence of the Settlement has
been proved on several occasions to be a necessity,
it has never before been used as a base for anything but defensive measures. When, in 1927, at
the time of the anti-British boycott, there was a
gathering of Chinese forces in the neighborhood,
an emergency was declared to exist, and the defence forces were stationed at the boundaries, just
as they were stationed at the end of last January.
The British also brought 15,000 troops to Shanghai for purposes of reinforcement, but while doing
so Sir Austen Chamberlain notified the League of
Nations of what was being done and explained
that the obj ect was purely the defence of British
nationals. That explanation was apparently ac-
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ceptable. The Japanese have endeavored to base
their recent action on the same ground of necessary defence for their nationals, who vastly outnumber the British and were undoubtedly in
greater peril, owing to the exposed position of
6,000 civilians in Chapei outside ·the Settlement.
The action of the Japanese, however, was more
open to the suspicion and fear of the Chinese that
an extensive invasion was premeditated, although
the relatively small number of bluejackets at first
employed makes it reasonable to suppose that the
Japanese had thought a mere demonstration of
force would be adequate. Here was the fundamental error of judgment which the past experience
of the Settlement and a better appraisal of the
moral and military resources of the Chinese
should probably have enabled them to avoid.
The Official American Attitude: Protection of
American Interests.
The official American attitude toward the whole
Sino-Chinese episode of 1931-32 has been governed by two considerations : the protection of
American nationals and American interests; and
secondly, as part of the latter, the fulfilment of
international obligations to which the United
States is a party. The United States Government
has not conceived it to be its duty to pass judgment on the underlying rights and wrongs of the
situation, or to do anything that could be interpreted as taking sides or intervening in the conflict. That the suspension of diplomatic relations
with Japan, an embargo on trade, or the prohibition of all intercourse on the part of its nationals
would be taking sides, there can be no doubt; and
nothing that has emanated from Washington
20

would justify the inference that any of these measures are contemplated. The overwhelming weight
of public opinion as expressed by the press and
the business community also seems to be opposed
to them.
Economic Measures Equivalent to War.
On the other hand, a considerable section of
.American opinion, led by men of the highest character and influence, has evidently regarded it as
the duty of the .American Government to be prepared for joint action with the League in applying against Japan the coercive measures of Article XVI of the Covenant. Another section of
.American opinion is conducting an agitation in
favor of individual abstention from the purchase
of Japanese commodities. Both movements are
alike in regarding the use of economic sanctions
as something less than an appeal to force, as distinguished from pacific measures such as would be
consistent with the letter, if not the spirit, of the
Pact of Paris. It is a curious phenomenon that
the most vehement supporters of economic pressure are to be found in the ranks of the pacifists
and of those who in general have been the strongest advocates of the substitution of reason and
conciliation for the resort to force. In this respect they have shown themselves far less conservative and conciliatory than those who doubt
whether armed force can yet be eliminated as an
instrument of national policy. I believe them to
be guilty of a deplorable inconsistency, and the
inconsistency becomes the more glaring if one
considers two grave implications of the kind of
intervention they so casually and lightly propose.
The :first is that the suspension of trade, in the
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volume that now goes on between the United
States and Japan, would have many of the consequences of war-consequences which all of us regard as the most terrible-namely, the suffering
of millions of non-combatants who have had no
part in the :fighting and no part in determining
the policies leading to war. It is ridiculous to suppose that such suffering is limited to the pocketbooks of a few capitalists: it means incalculable
hardship and widespread starvation among the
masses, whose economic reserves are already at a
low point. The second implication of economic
sanctions is that they would inevitably be taken,
and quite naturally taken, as hostile acts justifying resistance. If this be true, economic sanctions, however sanctified by inclusion in Article
XVI of the Covenant, would be very hard to reconcile with the pacific measures dictated by the Pact
of Paris as the exclusive instruments of national
policy. The very agitation in favor of embargoes
and boycotts has made the identical impression in
Japan that would be made by the advocacy of war,
and it is rapidly filling a reservoir of national
antipathies which are the worst fruits of war. If
American interests or the sanctity of peace treaties require protection by war, then let us have
economic sanctions by all means, and let war come,
but let us avoid the hypocrisy of pretending that
we are employing the harmless instrumentalities
of peace.
'

A Premature American Commitment.
In only two points do I :find fault with the attitude of our Secretary of State, who it seems to me
has otherwise admirably and courageously defined
the limits of American concern with the Sino-
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Japanese situation. The first is his statement
that the United States will not recognize any arrangements arrived at as a consequence of a
breach of the Pact. A complete reservation of
the American right to recognize or not to recognize such arrangements should have been the limit
of that declaration. The United States should always remain free to determine its attitude toward
a de facto situation in accordance with all the circumstances and interests involved at any given
time, present or future. The second fault which
I have to find with the Secretary of State is the
implication of his letter to Senator Borah that
just because the Nine-Power Treaty was entered
into in plain view of China's chaotic condition and
in order to protect her integrity by abstaining
from any interference with it during her efforts
toward internal order, there could be no limit to
the patience and self-restraint imposed upon an
aggrieved neighbor, and no limit to the amount of
injury to be suffered by that neighbor without retaliation. Mr. Stimson's doctrine of indefinite
patience is indefensible in principle, however open
to examination may be Japan's own construction
of the amount and duration of her grievances.
Adequacy of Peace Machinery.

A final word as to the adequacy of the machinery of peace. I am a firm believer in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of
Paris as important steps toward the abolition of
war. It would be fatuous to maintain or to expect
that they would be adequate to meet every strain
that could be put upon them. Experience has
shown that the heaviest strain is produced by a
conflict in which one party is conscious of intol-
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erable wrongs and injuries, while the other party
is in such a continuing state of disorder that no
authority competent or willing to discuss grievances or to enter into responsible undertakings
can be found. The machinery of peace does not
necessarily contemplate two equal parties; on the
contrary, the defence of the weak against the
strong is one of its main objects. On the other
hand, it does contemplate two parties who can talk
to each other and to other parties disposed to offer
mediation, and who can say authoritatively what
they will and what they will not do. It is not
enough that spokesmen should be found to give
verbal assurances of what China, in the present
instance, will do, or that she will be amenable to
all the obligations imposed by treaties and the
law of nations. There must be reliable evidence
that they speak with full competence and authority. This evidence as I have before indicated has
been conspicuously wanting.
Alternative Measures.
If the existing machinery of peace is inadequate, I do not see the slightest excuse for abandoning faith in it, but rather the strongest reasons for using it to the extent of its competence
and for studying its defects with a view to remedying them. At the moment, I see only two
alternatives: the first is cooperative intervention
by foreign Powers, preferably through the League. But this would involve the use of an international force in place of a resort to force by the
aggrieved party. World opinion has obviously
not arrived at the point where it is ready to organize or use an international force. The second
alternative would seem to be direct action by the
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aggrieved state, such action to be taken, not in
complete disregard of the League or the treaties,
but under the sponsorship of the League and with
accountability to it: in other words, a sort of mandate of the League, but a mandate sanctioning
self-defense and the restoration of order in the
region affected, with explicit disavowal of the intention to use the mandate as a pretext for territorial expansion or permanent violation of sovereignty. The League itself should remain the
judge as to the limits of such action and be a
party to any permanent adjustment.
Conclusion.
To sum up, the imperfections of China's sovereignty are the fundamental cause of her difficulties with Japan, as with other countries.
Japan's handling of her grievances against China
has been seriously compromised by the emergence
of the military authority and by its rather typical
disregard of the civil government and of international obligations when in conflict with its own
view of military necessity. The attitude of the
United States in limiting its concern to the protection of American nationals and interests has been
wise, but the Department of State has gone too far
in saying it would not recognize any arrangement
arrived at through a breach of the Pact of Paris.
A reservation of the American position in this regard would have been sufficient. The Department
also erred in implying that the Nine-Power Treaty
engaged its signatories to an indefinite tolerance
of the duration or amount of grievances occasioned by China's lack of effective sovereignty.
The existing machinery of peace seems inadequate
to deal with a dispute between two Powers one of
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which is lacking in effective authority and responsibility. The alternatives must be either international intervention through the League or direct
action by the aggrieved State but under the sponsorship of the League and with accountability
to it.
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